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Abstract 
 
As late as October 1997 the IMF declared that the Korean economy was experiencing a 
temporary liquidity squeeze, not a solvency problem. Yet in December 1997 Deputy 
Managing Director Stanley Fischer declared that Korea suffered from a systemic 
“breakdown of economic relations” so complete that only radical economic restructuring 
could restore prosperity. The IMF attached what it called “extreme structural 
conditionality” to its loan agreements with Korea, demanding a complete and rapid 
transition from Korea’s traditional East Asian economic model to a globally integrated 
neoliberal model. We subject the IMF’s assertion that the allocative efficiency of the 
Korean economy had collapsed by 1997 to a number of empirical tests, including time 
series and cross-section analyses of capital productivity and corporate profitability, and 
firm and industry level econometric tests of the proposition that investment spending was 
excessive and misallocated in the pre-crisis period. This evidence does not support the 
IMF’s systemic breakdown claim. We conclude that the IMF’s imposition of “extreme 
structural conditionality” on Korea is best understood as an illegitimate and anti-
democratic exercise of power designed to meet the needs of the IMF’s key constituents 
rather than those of the majority of Korea’s people. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Prior to late 1997, Korea’s version of the state-guided East Asian economic model was 
widely admired by Western economists, the IMF and the World Bank for its exceptional long-
term development record. It was also condemned by Western politicians, economists, and 
businessmen because it would not open itself fully to foreign industrial and financial investors 
who wanted to get in on the profit opportunities created by the Korean ‘miracle.’1  
 
The 1997 crisis and its aftermath changed the West’s view. The post-crisis conventional 
wisdom asserts that the structure of Korea’s economy prior to the crisis was fatally flawed. The 
East Asian model can be useful, Western economists grudgingly acknowledge, but only in the 
early phase of development, when markets are too immature to guide resource allocation 
efficiently and the ‘catch-up’ objectives of state industrial policy are straightforward. However, 
the story continues, as Korea’s economy matured, decisions became too complex for government 
bureaucrats to handle efficiently; the continued substitution of government-directed for market-
guided resource allocation created severe inefficiencies that were the ultimate cause of the crisis. 
As Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan put it: “planning by some East Asian countries can look very 
successful for a time…but there are limits to this process as economies mature. Asian policy 
makers are learning that government-directed investments, though successful for a while, 
inevitably lead to overproduction of goods that neither domestic nor foreign consumers want” 
(Wall Street Journal, “Greenspan Sees Asian Woes Aiding Free Markets,” April 3, 1998).2 
Under pressure from foreign and domestic neoliberal enthusiasts, Korea did liberalize its 
economy significantly in the decade preceding the crisis, and mainstream economists 
acknowledge that this process made the dramatic rise in short-term foreign debt that triggered the 
crisis possible. However, they insist that liberalization was not the fundamental cause of the 
crisis; it merely exposed the underlying rot within. (See Korean Development Institute 1999, 
Greenspan 1999, Brittain 1997, Hahm and Mishkin 2000, Borensztein and Lee 1999, and 
Krueger and Yoo 2001.)  
 
There is an alternative interpretation of recent events in Korea, whose adherents include 
numerous heterodox scholars (Chang 1998, Singh 1999, Wade and Veneroso 1998, Crotty and 
Dymski 2001, Crotty and Lee 2001) along with a few prestigious mainstream economists such as 
Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist for the World Bank, and Harvard’s Dani Rodrik. These 
authors argue that the major cause of the crisis was not inherent inefficiencies in the structure of 
the Korean development model, but rather contingent inefficiencies created by liberalization, 
especially in the 1990s. This liberalization process disastrously weakened the structural integrity 
and coherence of the traditional Korean economic system. In this view, the problem in the 1990s 
was not too much state intervention, but the cessation of government functions essential to 
efficiency within the Korean model. In particular, absent the drastic weakening of the 
government’s traditional regulation of short-term capital inflows in the 1990s, there would have 
been no system-shaking financial crisis, no IMF takeover, and no radical neoliberal restructuring. 
 
Determining which side of this debate is correct is of great importance, not only for 
Korea, but also for the theory of economic development and the policy prescriptions that flow 
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from it. If the ultimate cause of the Korean crisis was the inherent inefficiency of state-guided 
development models in all countries that move beyond the early stages of development, then 
Korea’s 35-year economic ‘miracle’ holds mostly negative lessons. Though there are as yet no 
neoliberal development success stories, reliance on economic guidance by a developmental state 
would apparently lead to even worse results than neoliberalism. (See Amsden 2001 and Chang 
2003 for support of the hypothesis that all successful development experiences have taken place 
under anti-neoliberal policies and structures.) In other words, There Is No Alternative to 
neoliberalism.  
 
Conversely, if one accepts the potential efficiency of state-guided growth, and sees its 
erosion via liberalization in the 1990s as the ultimate cause of the crisis in Korea, then 
neoliberalism becomes the cause of the demise of Korea’s prosperity, not the vehicle for its 
rescue, and state-guided growth remains an economically viable option for less developed 
countries.  
 
We have argued elsewhere (Crotty and Lee 2001) that Korea did not face a solvency or 
structural crisis in 1997. Therefore, we believe that the Korean government should have 
intervened forcefully when the crisis broke out to support the growth of aggregate demand, hold 
interest rates at reasonable levels, and make sure that domestic credit continued to be made 
available to firms that would be viable under normal economic conditions. This was how the 
government reacted to earlier external shocks of even greater severity. Most important, the 
government should have postponed consideration of any economic restructuring until after the 
crisis had passed. Rational restructuring is impossible in the heat of crisis. When the economy is 
in a state of economic and financial collapse, there are no objective criteria for distinguishing 
firms and banks that are potentially healthy from those that are not -- a deep contraction and 
credit crunch will injure both well- and poorly-managed firms, especially in Korea’s high debt 
model. 
 
It was the perverse policy response to the Korean crisis put in place by the IMF, not 
structural deficiencies in the Korean economy, that was the main cause of the near depression 
conditions of 1998 and early 1999. The IMF raised the short term interest rate from 13% in early 
December to 34% just one month later, holding it above 20% through mid 1998. In an interview 
with one of the authors in February 1998, a high ranking Bank of Korea (BOK) official 
acknowledged that it was the IMF who determined interest rates in Korea, not the BOK. The 
IMF imposed restrictive fiscal policy as well. As aggregate demand collapsed, the IMF brought 
on a credit supply crunch by closing down banks and implementing for the first time in Korea 
the Basle capital adequacy standards – in the midst of deep recession! Real domestic demand fell 
by 13.8% in 1998 and the rate of unemployment, which was 2.1% in October 1997 (and had 
been below 3% for years) rose to 3.1% in December, 7% in June 1998 and peaked at 8.7% in 
February 1999.  
 
The thesis that Korea faced a liquidity crisis in late 1997, not a systemic failure is one 
that the IMF at least implicitly acknowledged in statements made both just before the crisis and 
several years after it. In its October 1997 report on Korea, the IMF stated that Korea had been hit 
with a temporary liquidity squeeze only – it called attention to the “absence of deeper solvency 
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concerns.” At that time, the IMF’s worst-case scenario for Korea in light of the Asian crisis was 
a drop in the growth rate to 4.5% in 1998 – not the 6.8% decline it actually experienced under 
IMF policies (IMF 2003a, 162-63). Yet in December 1997, just two month later, the IMF 
declared that the Korean economy was in a state of profound structural dysfunction, requiring 
radical emergency surgery. This was the reason it imposed what it called “extreme structural 
conditionality” on Korea, along with tight monetary and fiscal policy to restore foreign investor 
confidence (IMF 2003a, p. 179).  
 
The IMF’s post-crisis evaluation report of 2003 agrees with its October 1997 view. It 
says that if the IMF and World Bank had announced that they would provide Korea with as 
much foreign exchange as it needed, there would not have been a financial crisis at all. On the 
other hand, “A delayed or highly conditional commitment of funds would do nothing to reverse 
the drive by creditors to liquidate their investments while they still could” -- but that is all the 
IMF and World Bank provided (IMF 2003a, p. 193). In other words, with appropriate assistance 
from the IMF and World Bank, the financial and general economic crises that took place in late 
1997 and early 1998 would not have occurred. Unfortunately, “the financing packages…were 
not large in relation to potential private capital flows. Moreover, not all of the money was 
available – especially at the outset – to counter market pressure” (Lane 1999, p. 45). Though up 
to $58 billion was pledged, by January 9, 1998, with the Korean economy and currency in free-
fall, the IMF had only lent Korea a total of $13.1 billion in a series of small payments, each 
conditioned on agreement by the Korean government to accept additional IMF demands.  
 
We note in passing that the post-crisis neoliberal economic regime imposed on Korea has 
not been a success. GDP growth did rebound briskly in 1999 and 2000 as the trade surplus 
temporarily rose to record highs and macro policy shifted from restrictive to expansionary. An 
IMF-created miracle was widely proclaimed. But GDP growth fell again in 2001 to 3.1% – the 
slowest growth since the early 1980s save for the collapse in 1998. 2002 saw another spurt 
forward to over 6% growth, but this was largely the result of what may be the most rapid 
household debt explosion ever, as the government tried to jump-start the sluggish economy by 
enacting tax incentives for debt-financed consumption, and banks fled corporate lending for 
temporarily more profitable consumer loans. Household debt more than doubled between 1997 
and 2002. It averaged 41% of GDP in the 1994-97 period, rose to 51% in 2000, then accelerated 
to reach 62% in 2001 and 74% in 2002.3 By way of comparison, household debt to GDP was 
79% in the highly leveraged US in 2000. But while the ratio of household debt to the value of 
household assets is only 29% in the US, it is now 48% in Korea.   
 
When the household lending bubble burst early in 2003, consumer spending stopped 
growing (it fell by 1.1% in the first nine months of 2003) and economic growth again sputtered. 
The BOK predicts growth in 2003 of just 3 %.  Thus, average annual real GDP growth in the 
neoliberal era is less than 4%, whereas in the bad old days of 1987-97 it was 7.7%. Worse yet, 
radical neoliberal restructuring is rapidly destroying the economic and political preconditions 
necessary for a return to long-term prosperity. Investment as a percent of GDP fell from 38% in 
1996 to 26% in 2002 – the second lowest rate since 1975, at which point it was 3.1% below the 
national saving rate, an indication of substantial aggregate demand deficiency.  Moreover, the 
distribution of income has become much more regressive. In our view, this deterioration in 
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performance is the inevitable result of the substitution of neoliberalism for Korea’s traditional 
economic model.  
 
The central question addressed in this essay is: was the Korean economy structurally 
dysfunctional in late 1997, and therefore in need of the radical neoliberal restructuring demanded 
by the IMF, World Bank and senior US officials? Or, did these agents use a false claim of 
structural breakdown to rationalize seizure of control of Korea’s economy and the 
implementation of policies that served the interests of their own constituents and not those of the 
Korean people?4  
 
The paper is organized as follows. First, after explaining how ill-conceived 
liberalization starting in the late 1980s made the onset of crisis almost inevitable, we argue that 
the IMF agreements with Korea in December 1997 and beyond demanded nothing short of a 
complete transformation of the Korean economy. The only possible rational justification for such 
radical demands is the belief that the Korean economic system had completely broken down. The 
main thesis in this paper is that this belief was wrong and therefore the demand by the IMF and 
the US that Korea put itself through a radical institutional transformation should have been 
rejected by Korea – as it would have been if the Korean people had been allowed to vote on it. 
Reform, not revolution, was the medicine appropriate to Korea’s economic problems in 1997, 
and decisions about how to respond to the crisis should have made through a democratic political 
process, not dictated under threat of economic chaos by external neoliberal forces in 
collaboration with leaders of the large Korean conglomerates known as chaebol. 
 
Second, we show that right up until the outbreak of crisis in late 1997, the conventional 
wisdom among Western economists was that the Korean economy was exceptionally efficient 
and the Korean version of the East Asian economy fundamentally sound. Post crisis 
condemnations of the cronyism and corruption of the mid 1990s Korean economy are suspect to 
some extent because they constitute such an obvious exercise in revisionist history 
 
Finally, in the main body of the paper we argue that the bulk of the available empirical 
evidence supports the proposition that the real-sector resource allocation process in the Korean 
economy, though it did suffer a modest decline in efficiency as the result of unwise liberalization 
after the late 1980s, remained essentially sound in the 1990s. It was primarily the mode of 
investment finance and the instability of short-term capital flows, not the process of real-sector 
resource allocation, which made the economy vulnerable to crisis.   
 
The correct response to the crisis would have been to fix what actually had broken. The 
government should have repaired the damage done by financial liberalization by reconstituting 
effective capital controls and creating an appropriate system of state regulation of domestic 
financial markets.5 The government could then have moved to address economic problems posed 
by the excesses of the chaebol, and made the broad outlines of economic policy more responsive 
to democratic processes and less responsive to chaebol and foreign political pressures. It was the 
modernization and democratization of the Korean economy that was called for, not the forced 
imposition of neoliberalism.  
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II. The 1997 Financial Crisis and the IMF Response 
 
The decade ending in 1997 saw a deliberate weakening of the traditional Korean model. 
Three crucial structural changes took place. First, the government ended its industrial policy and 
eliminated its regulation and coordination of chaebol investment decisions. Second, important 
aspects of domestic financial markets were substantially liberalized. In particular, the 
government permitted the creation of new non-bank financial intermediaries that were free from 
government monitoring and regulation. These institutions channeled funds to the chaebol groups 
that controlled them.  Third, government controls over short-term capital inflows, especially 
loans, were relaxed. It should be noted that while these changes were championed by external 
neoliberal forces, they were also demanded by the chaebol, who wanted freedom from 
government regulation and access to foreign loans that in the mid 1990s cost them only half the 
domestic interest rate (Chang, Park and Yoo 1998, Weiss 1999, and Lee et. al. 2002).   
 
It should have been obvious that the weakening of all three tools of state economic 
guidance would cause serious problems that could expose the economy to potential crises.  The 
elimination of controls on the inflow of short-term capital took place at a time when it was in 
excess supply -- repelled by the low interest rates in the West in the early 1990s and attracted by 
the Asian economic ‘miracle.’ This guaranteed that bank loans and portfolio investment would 
flood the area. This is what generally happens when a previously “repressed” financial system is 
forced open through liberalization. With key domestic financial markets freed from government 
control, these short-term foreign funds would be used to accelerate an already rapid pace of 
investment in Korea, where, as we will see, incentives to invest were strong in the mid 1990s. 
Since industrial policy and state coordination of investment had ended, the chaebol 
conglomerates could now invest as they pleased. By 1997, any significant outflow of foreign 
funds was likely to trigger a financial and currency crisis.  
 
Contrary to popular belief, Korea’s main financial problem was not that chaebol firms 
borrowed more heavily in the mid 1990s than they had previously. For all firms of the top-30 
chaebol, the debt-equity ratio, which was near 5 in 1986-87, stayed well below 4 from 1993-96, 
before leaping to 5.2 as the crisis broke out in 1997. Firms of the top-5 chaebol groups have a 
similar time profile, but with lower absolute leverage values. The debt-equity ratio of top-5 
chaebol manufacturing firms was 3.9 in 1986-87, but it dropped to 2.8 in the mid 1990s. It did 
not surpass its 1980s high until 1997. This holds true for all manufacturing firms as well 
(Krueger and Yoo 2001, Appendix Table 5)  
 
In the wake of capital account liberalization, foreign debt rose dramatically in Korea. 
Debt to foreign banks tripled between 1994 and 1996. By late 1997, it reached $120 billion. 
Much of this debt was used to finance chaebol investment spending. Total foreign debt as a 
percent of Korean GDP was not out of line with developing country experience. The problem 
was that two-thirds of the foreign debt was short term, with about 20% due in the first quarter of 
1998 (OECD 1998, p. 5). Korean borrowers were not concerned about their dependence on 
short-term foreign loans because foreign creditors led them to believe they would automatically 
roll the loans over as they came due. Foreign banks were confident that their loans were secure 
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because everyone expected the Korean miracle to continue indefinitely, and the IMF was always 
there to bail them out if unexpected trouble hit.  
 
Thus, by 1996 the Korean economy had become extremely financially fragile. Korean 
companies and banks could pay back their foreign loans only if the following set of conditions 
were sustained indefinitely -- a healthy domestic economy, reasonable trade performance, 
continued growth of earnings in local currencies, and the absence of a decline in the exchange 
value of the won. In other words, liberalization had brought Korea to the point where a financial 
crisis was almost inevitable. When a large drop in the rate of export growth hit Asia in 1996, it 
led to key loan defaults by some highly-levered chaebol firms and thus to an increase in domestic 
nonperforming bank loans in the first half of 1997. 
 
The Asian financial crisis kicked off by the devaluation of the Thai bhat in July 1997 
eventually pulled many Asian countries down, the strong as well as the weak.6 Foreign banks 
rushed for the door, and portfolio investors pulled out of the region. According to the Institute for 
International Finance, net private capital flows to Asia dropped from $176 billion in 1996 to $69 
billion in 1997 (and again to near zero in 1998). Net commercial bank loans went from $80 
billion in 1996 to minus $15 billion in 1997 (and to minus $60 billion one year later) 
(International Institute of Finance 2000, p. 3). Though Korea was initially considered too strong 
to be affected by the crisis that hit the weaker South East Asian economies, investors in the heat 
of panic lost their ability to distinguish between strong and weak investments; they just wanted 
to get out of Asia. Net foreign loans, which had been $11.6 billion in 1996, fell to minus $26.6 
billion in 1997 -- and remained negative for the next three years. Total net private financial flows 
into Korea fell by $38 billion between 1996 and 1997 -- almost eight percent of 1997 GDP, a 
shock that would stagger any financial system, no matter how well run (Asian Development 
Bank 2001, p. 21).  
 
The first IMF agreement was signed on December 4th. By this time, the won-dollar 
exchange rate had jumped from to 1249 from its value of 987 in late November. Investors 
understood that the “extreme conditionality” at the heart of the agreement reflected the IMF’s 
assessment that the Korean economy was irredeemably corrupt, inefficient, and in need of 
radical restructuring, and they knew that IMF-imposed austerity macro policy ensured a short-
term economic collapse. The won-dollar rate thus fell to 1900 in early January – a total decline in 
the value of the won of 50% from its 1996 level, a level the IMF said at the time was not 
overvalued.  
 
The corporate bond rate leapt from 14.1% in November 1997 to 24.3% in December. As 
late as mid 1998, when the Korea economy was in a state of total collapse, Treasury Secretary 
Rubin was still “spreading the gospel of high interest rates to troubled Asian nations that don’t 
want to hear it.” His main argument was that the most important goal was to restore foreign 
investor confidence through radical structural reform, but “easy money would hinder such 
changes” (Wall Street Journal, “Rubin Prescribes Tight Money for Asia,” June 30, 1998).  
 
The IMF’s long-term objective was the complete deconstruction of the traditional Korean 
model. In its own explanation of its response to the Asian crisis offered in January 1999, the IMF 
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emphasized that “forceful, far-reaching structural reforms are at the heart of all [our] programs, 
marking an evolution in emphasis from many of the programs that the IMF has supported in the 
past” (emphasis in original). The structural reforms included the need to “break the close links 
between government and business” that define the East Asian model, “ensure the integration of 
the national economy with international financial markets,” increase the “potential for foreign 
participation in domestic financial systems,” and “remove impediments to growth such as 
monopolies [i.e., the chaebol system], and trade barriers…” (IMF 1999).  In other words, the 
IMF argued that only radical structural reform could save the Korean economy. The IMF’s 
evaluation of its performance in the Asian crisis refers to IMF demands on Korea as “extreme 
structural conditionality” (IMF 2003a, p. 179)  
 
Conservative economist Martin Feldstein, Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisors under President Reagan, argued that “the International Monetary Fund seized the 
troubles in the region as an opportunity to insist on fundamental structural reforms, … asserting 
that they needed to remake their financial systems, tax and tariff structures, labour markets, 
central banking procedures and corporate governance” Yet in fact “Korea only needed a 
temporary restructuring of its foreign bank loans to give Koreans time to accumulate the reserves 
needed to service the debts.” (Financial Times, “Trying to do too much”, March 5, 1998).  
 
His answer to the question of why the IMF took advantage of Korea’s temporary 
illiquidity to force the country to adopt radical structural reforms was that the IMF was a tool 
used to force Korea to implement policies desired by the US and Japan. 
 
Several features of the IMF plan are replays of the policies that Japan and the United 
States have been long trying to get Korea to adopt. These include accelerating the 
previously agreed upon reductions of trade barriers to specific Japanese products and 
opening capital markets so that foreign investors can have majority ownership of Korean 
firms, engage in hostile takeovers opposed by local management, and expand direct 
participation in banking and other financial services. ...Koreans and others saw this aspect 
of the plan as an abuse of IMF power to force Korea at time of weakness to accept trade 
and investment policies it had previously rejected. (Foreign Affairs, “Refocusing the 
IMF,” March/April 1998, p. 32) 
 
Keep in mind that, as the Wall Street Journal noted in an editorial: “The U.S. Treasury 
provides the lion’s share of hard currency to the IMF. And in return – as is well known at the 
Fund, on Wall Street and in the capitals of the IMFs chief client nations – Treasury calls the 
main shots at the IMF” (“Focusing the IMF Debate”, May 7, 1998). The New York Times noted 
that Treasury Secretary “Rubin, Greenspan, and Lawrence Summers, the deputy Treasury 
secretary, argued … that the IMF had succeeded in using its bailouts to force [Asian] nations to 
open their markets and transform their economies… (“Greenspan Sees Present Crisis Moving 
Asia Towards Western Capitalism”, February 13, 1998). Even the IMF acknowledges the 
existence of strong outside pressure, especially from the US government. “The IMF’s major 
shareholder governments made no secret of their view that IMF assistance should be 
accompanied by strong reforms. The U.S. authorities in particular insisted that strong reforms 
should be a condition of IMF support” (IMF 2003a, p. 185). 
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Moreover, the IMF demanded that the radical neoliberal restructuring of Korea begin 
immediately -- in the chaos of the crisis, at the same time that austerity macro policy was being 
implemented.7  
 
The IMF acted in a manner more appropriate for an occupying military power than an 
international agency designed to assist countries in distress.8 The breadth and depth of IMF 
dictates to the Korean government were referred to in the press as “unprecedented.” To 
recapitulate, they included demands to: free capital markets from remaining government control 
(which were still substantial); breakup the chaebol conglomerates; destroy Korea’s powerful 
labor unions by implementing labor market ‘flexibility’; make the central bank independent of 
democratic processes; eliminate managed trade; and remove all remaining impediments to cross 
border capital flows and the takeover of Korean firms and banks by foreign enterprises. (See 
Republic of Korea: Request for a Standby Arrangement, December 3, 1997, www.chosun.com.) 
As Chang and Park put it: “the “reform” package, at least on paper, is far reaching and includes 
everything short of the forceful disbandment and ownership transfer that the large German 
industrial concerns and the Japanese zaibatsus were subject to immediately after the war” (1999, 
p. 3). 
 
Having declared that Korea had reached a terminal state of inefficiency, neoliberals 
presumed that reform of the traditional Korean model was out of the question. Koreans had no 
choice but to accept a process of radical neoliberal reform. In a wide ranging speech in April 
1998 titled “The Ascendence of Market Capitalism,” Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that 
neither the “caring capitalisms” of Europe nor the state led capitalisms of East Asia could 
withstand forever the assault of global neoliberalism. The Asian crisis was “an important 
milestone in what evidently has been a significant and seemingly inexorable trend toward market 
capitalism” of the US style. In Greenspan’s view, though area governments “relied on markets in 
most respects, they also used elements of central planning in the form of credit allocation, and 
those elements, in my view, turned out to be their Achilles heel.” East Asian countries “can look 
very successful for a time because they started from a low technology base... but there are limits 
to this process as economies mature”. “Eventually and inevitably” such a regime was bound to 
fail once it opened itself to the winds of international competition. (April 18, 1998, 
www.federalreserve.org).  
 
The IMF agreements in Asia were clearly understood in the West as proof of the final 
defeat of Asian-style capitalism in the long-standing war between the East Asian model and US-
style neoliberalism. The New York Times quotes Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Rubin and 
Under Secretary Summers as arguing “that the IMF had succeeded in using its bailouts [in Asia] 
to force nations to open their markets and transform their economies” (“Greenspan Sees Present 
Crisis Moving Asia Toward West’s Capitalism,” February 13, 1998). Former US Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger commented that “If the definition of a revolution is fundamental change in 
the economic and political system, …what we are trying to engineer in some of these countries is 
clearly a revolution” (New York Times, “Indonesian Faceoff,” March 7, 1998). Alan Greenspan 
proclaimed that one of the most fundamental effects of the Asian crisis was “a worldwide move 
toward the Western form of free market capitalism instead of the competing Asian approach that 
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only a few years ago looked like an attractive alternative model for nations around the 
world”(New York Times, February 13, 1998). In an article that stressed his “association with the 
free market political philosopher Ayn Rand,” Greenspan “predicted the Asian financial crisis… 
eventually will be viewed as a milestone in the triumph of market capitalism” (Wall Street 
Journal, “Greenspan Sees Asian Woes Aiding Free Markets,”April 3, 1998). This triumphalism 
was summed up nicely by a Wall Street Journal headline that simply stated, “We Won”. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the onset of crisis the IMF defended its imposition of ‘big-
bang’ radical restructuring by insisting that the Korean economic system was structurally 
dysfunctional. “The past model of government-directed industrialization brought tremendous 
economic progress, but also contained inherent flaws and is no longer suited to Korea as an 
advanced economy in globalized markets” (IMF 1998, p. 29).  In response to the question: “Is it 
possible for Korea to reform the current system of industrial policy, or will it be necessary to 
dismantle it?” Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer replied: 
  
I don’t think this restructuring would be possible within the Korean model. What has 
happened in Korea is a breakdown of economic relations caused by that system—the 
banks were being used to funnel money from abroad into corporations that were not 
being subjected to market discipline and whose financial structures were not clear. (IMF 
Survey, December 15, 1997, p. 387, emphasis added) 
 
Writing in Finance and Development, a journal of the IMF and World Bank, in 1998 
John Lipsky noted that: “The catalytic role of external capital flows in triggering the crisis has 
been over-estimated – in essence, treating symptoms of deeper problems as if they were the 
problems themselves” (p. 10). It was “only the implementation of significant structural reforms” 
that ended the crisis (p. 12). In an 1999 Finance and Development article, Bijan Aghevli declared 
that “there is a consensus on the causes of the [Asian] crisis”: “domestic allocation of these 
borrowed foreign resources was inefficient because of weak banking systems, poor corporate 
governance, and a lack of transparency.” (p. 28) Responding to critics who argued that the IMF 
should have concerned itself only with macro policies upon taking charge of the affected Asian 
countries, the article retorts: “But the main source of the problems in all these countries was 
structural – the weakness of the financial and corporate sectors” (p. 30). The IMF Survey of 
March 6, 2000 states that “While a severe international liquidity squeeze triggered the crisis, 
structural weaknesses were at the heart of Korea’s problems” (p. 78). US Under Secretary of the 
Treasury Larry Summers, stated the US-IMF position nicely: this crisis “is profoundly different 
because it has its roots not in improvidence, but in the economic structures. The problems that 
must be fixed are much more microeconomic than macroeconomic, and involve the private 
sector more and the public sector less” (Financial Times, February 20, 1998). 
 
But if the system was in fact so corrupt and inefficient in the mid 1990s that it inevitably 
caused a system-shaking crisis, we should to be able to see clear evidence of this collapse of 
efficiency in the pre-crisis data. As we show below, if real-sector efficiency declined at all, its 
decline was modest. The Korean economic system was not deeply and inherently flawed in the 
1990s, as neoliberals claimed ex post, and therefore the Korean people did have different 
alternative development paths open to them. They should have been permitted to debate the 
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merits of these alternatives without threat and coercion, and make their selection in an open 
democratic process.  
 
III. Revisionist History: Mainstream Economists Praised the Korean Model 
in the Mid 1990s 
 
The view that the achievements of the East Asia model were extraordinary and that the 
powerful role and effective role played by the state was in large part responsible for these 
achievements was not widely contested by mainstream economists prior to the crisis. It was the 
conventional wisdom. 
 
For example, Stanley Fischer, later to become chief economist for the IMF, wrote in 1996 
that “there really has been a miracle in East Asia”; and that the view that government action was 
central to this success is “widely shared” (1996, pp. 345 and 347). In the year preceding the 
crisis, he argued: 
 
First, the growth process is not about to collapse; the notion that, because this is largely 
an extensive growth process, it has to end abruptly is just wrong. Second, success in 
this region breeds success: there is a virtuous circle... Countries have to be vigilant to 
ensure that they do not destroy the process by allowing overheating or otherwise 
allowing the macro economy to get out of hand. But none of the East Asian countries 
has pursued an excessively easy macroeconomic policy...so the risk of a prolonged 
slowdown caused by a need for major macroeconomic adjustments is small. (1996, pp. 
349-50). 
 
That same year, William McDonough, President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, 
expressed admiration for the great economic achievements made in East Asia in the recent past, 
calling performance there a “growth miracle.” He continued, “Asia’s economic future looks 
brighter today than it has at any time in the post war period” (McDonough 1996, p. 3). No hint 
here of deep-seated corruption and inefficiency.  
 
Until the early 1990s, the World Bank and IMF denied that industrial and financial 
allocation policies or area governments played any significant role in the creation of the East 
Asian “miracle.” Rather, they emphasized the Amarket friendly” nature of government policies 
and the Areluctant@ character of state interference with markets. However, this position was in 
such obvious conflict with the facts that in 1993 the World Bank published The East Asian 
Miracle (World Bank 1993), a study that acknowledged the importance of state economic 
guidance in East Asia and admitted that many area governments implemented their 
responsibilities as developmental states effectively and efficiently.
 
The March 1994 issue of the IMF and World Bank’s Finance and Development was 
devoted to the “The Asian Miracle.” The lead article observed that “never before have “countries 
expanded so fast for so long,” and applauded the “exceptional long-term growth in output, 
productivity, saving, capital accumulation, and human capital as well as the decline in income 
 
 12
inequality in the area” (p. 2). Governments were praised because they “adopted the principle of 
shared economic growth as a major economic goal... and convinced economic elites to support 
pro-growth policies [and] share the benefits of growth with the middle class and the poor” (p. 5). 
State policy was considered to be responsible for creating the very high saving rates in the area, 
not just by maintaining high real interest rates but by “creating secure bank-based financial 
systems through strong prudential regulation, good supervision, and institutional reforms” -- 
qualities which, after the crisis, were said to be totally absent from the affected countries’ 
financial markets!  
 
The article also acknowledged the contribution made by industrial policy to the 
achievement of investment efficiency, stressing the effectiveness of the government monitoring 
and regulation process, especially in Korea and Japan, where governments: 
 
created “contests” that combined competition with the benefits of cooperation among 
firms... Such contests range from very simple nonmarket allocation rules, such as access 
to rationed credit for exporters, to very complex coordination of private investment in the 
government-business deliberation councils of Japan and Korea. The key feature of each 
contest is that the government distributes rewards -- access to credit or foreign exchange -
- based on performance, which the government and competing firms monitor (p. 5). 
 
The second article also lauded the efficiency of investment allocation in the area: 
 
Investment as a percent of GDP has risen sharply in the past quarter of a century, and 
estimates of rates of return are similarly favorable. ... The quality of investments 
derives in part from superior growth performance that validates past investment 
decisions -- a kind of virtuous circle -- but also stems from above average 
implementation and the strength of institutions. ... Many of the gains in East Asia come 
from total factor productivity growth, which averages three to six times the developing 
country average. (p. 6)  
 
The quality of government economic policy gets consistently high grades. The act of 
developing a “national consensus concerning the direction of economic policy, beginning with 
land redistribution in Korea and Taiwan and large-scale public housing investments in Hong 
Kong and Singapore” is noted, as well as the general efficiency of government economic 
bureaucracies. 
  
Effective policymaking was aided by an effective bureaucracy. In most East Asian 
countries, because government service confers status, governments are able to select 
the most highly qualified individuals. Starting with a highly motivated and well-trained 
cadre of individuals, East Asian governments by and large were able to organize 
themselves efficiently, often using the concept of core economic ministries... A pioneer 
among organizations was the Economic Planning Board in Korea... p. (9) 
 
The third article focuses on the centrality and effectiveness of industrial and financial 
policy in Japan and Korea. “Japan and Korea shared the way they managed and implemented 
 
 13
policies. The governments had clear, credible, and flexible versions of the objectives of both 
industrial policy and policy-based finance. ... The most distinguishing feature of the Japanese 
and Korean experience was the high degree and effectiveness of monitoring” (p. 11). 
 
These three articles adequately represent the assessment of the East Asian model by the 
IMF and World Bank in 1994, just three years before the onset of the Asian crisis. They express 
no concern about cronyism, rent seeking, limitless empire building by reckless conglomerates, 
inadequate bank regulation, or bureaucratic inefficiency -- problems said only a few years later 
to be endemic. On the contrary, they not only acknowledge the powerful and effective economic 
role played by the state, but argue that what differentiated area countries from less successful 
developing nations was precisely the superb quality of their governments’ monitoring of, and 
control over, the firms they favored through industrial policy and the banks that were instruments 
of the state.  
 
Thus, a few years prior to the crisis, even the most important ideological enemies of the 
East Asian model were forced to admit that there was no important inherent or even contingent 
structural deficiency in the Korean version of the East Asian model.  
 
Moreover, the IMF the World Bank continued to praise East Asian economies right 
through late 1997. Furman and Stiglitz point out that “until the outbreak of the crisis, East Asian 
economies were widely praised for rapid growth with equity that resulted in large reductions in 
poverty and increases in longevity” (1998, p. 10). On December 11, 1997 Jeffrey Sachs observed 
that “Three months ago there was not a hint of alarm [by the IMF concerning the Korean 
economy], only a call for further financial sector reforms – incidentally without mentioning the 
chaebol (conglomerates), or the issue of foreign ownership of banks, or banking supervision that 
now figure so prominently in the IMF’s Korea programme.” He continued: “There is no 
‘fundamental” reason for Asia’s financial calamity except financial panic itself”. He also 
observed that in its 1997 annual report, the World Bank said that IMF “Directors welcomed 
Korea’s continued impressive macroeconomic performance [and] praised the authorities for their 
enviable fiscal record” (Financial Times, “IMF is a Power Unto Itself,” December 11 1997). The 
IMF mission in Korea in October 1997 “concluded that Korea would avoid being seriously 
affected by the crisis…” (IMF 2003a, p. 35). And foreign investors, both naive individuals and 
sophisticated institutional professionals, kept pouring money into to area right into 1997.  
 
Paul Krugman was one of the few critics who claimed to have discovered a flaw of sorts 
in the Asian model before the crisis broke out. In a widely discussed paper (Krugman 1994) he 
argued that East Asian growth was caused by pouring an usually high percent of GDP into 
capital formation -- not through improvements in technology or total factor productivity. Thus, 
growth was merely ‘extensive,’ a movement along a pre-existing production function. Stanley 
Fisher rightly pointed out in response that even if Krugman was correct about this, the ability to 
invest as much as 30% and more of GDP annually while remaining on the production possibility 
frontier was an enormous achievement. Others made telling criticisms of the econometric 
exercise on which Krugman’s conclusions were based. (See Bosworth and Collins 1996, Rodrik 
1997). More important, the logical conclusion that should be drawn from Krugman’s model is 
that Asia would experience a slow decline in its rapid rate of growth if it did not achieve faster 
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technological progress, not that it was so inefficient that a sharp crisis like the one that took place 
in 1997 was likely.  
 
In sum, prior to 1997, mainstream conventional wisdom was that that Korea’s mid 1990s 
version of the East Asian economic model was extraordinarily effective. Given this glowing 
assessment, how credible is the post-crisis conventional wisdom that the mid 1990s Korean 
economy was so structurally inefficient there was no sense in trying to reform it?   
 
IV. Did the Korean Economy Collapse in the mid 1990s?: 
Non-Econometric Empirical Evidence 
 
The ex post story of the alleged collapse of the Korean economy is usually told in the 
following way. In the 1990s the chaebol conglomerates went on an irrational investment spree, 
borrowing and investing far more than made economic sense. They did this because they were 
controlled by individual families who sought size for its own sake, rather than by efficient capital 
markets. Moreover, financial liberalization gave the chaebol access for the first time to limitless 
finance at low interest rates, both via newly available foreign bank loans and through domestic 
financial enterprises controlled by the chaebol. Foreign banks lent money to the chaebol because 
they believed they were “too big to fail”: the government would bail them out if they became 
insolvent. The end result of this out-of-control economic system was a deep decline in capital 
efficiency that led to a sharp drop in profitability and a qualitative and unsustainable leap in 
indebtedness. When the Asian crisis hit the broken-down Korean economy in late 1997, it 
collapsed like a house of cards. 
 
In this section, we examine empirical evidence on the health of the Korean economy in 
the mid 1990s. The reader should be aware that, to the best of our knowledge, there are no 
available methods, models or templates we can adopt to investigate the question of whether the 
Korean economic system had become structurally dysfunctional and unviable in the mid 1990s. 
In 1997, Western analysts came to the conclusion that the Korean economy was dysfunctional 
without delineating appropriate criteria for making such a determination.  For this reason, we are 
forced to follow an eclectic strategy and analyze a number of relevant data sets. 
 
Was the Investment Boom of the 1990s Irrational Ex Ante? 
 
We preface our empirical review by stressing an important fact. Even if capital 
productivity and corporate profitability did deteriorate in response to the investment boom of the 
mid 1990s, this would not by itself demonstrate that the investment decision-making process was 
irrational or inefficient. Investment decisions can only be made in response to projections or 
guesses about future profit prospects, and these must be based on current and past data.  
 
The key question should be: was it obvious ex ante that the investment decisions of 
Korea’s big conglomerates were irrational or grossly irresponsible? We present two arguments 
that suggest the positive investment response of the period was not obviously irrational.  
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First, by the early 1990s, competition in global markets had become so intense that firms 
in important global industries faced the following bitter choice: continue to invest even in the 
face of slim profit margins, falling industry rates of capacity utilization, and increasing leverage, 
or withdraw from the industry – a move that would destroy much of the value of their physical 
and organizational capital. Asset sales in periods of industry stress often bring as little as 10 to 30 
percent of their original cost.  
 
This issue is discussed in detail in Crotty (1993, 2000, 2002, 2003) and in Brenner 2002. 
The rapid spread of neoliberalism around the globe caused a slowdown in the pace of global 
demand growth that induced sluggish sales growth in key global manufacturing industries -- such 
as autos, airplanes, computers, chemicals, semiconductors, electric appliances, steel, ship 
building, and machine tools. The rate of growth of world GDP in the 1990s was by far the lowest 
of any decade in the post World War II era and the period from 1989 through 1993 was 
particularly sluggish. Yet supply in such industries kept growing. The high industry excess 
capacity that resulted put intense competitive pressure on all firms. This problem was quite 
severe for export-dependent East Asian economies. (See Kaplinsky 1998, Ernst 1998, and Erturk 
2002 for details of this problem in Asia.)  
 
Large Northern multinational corporations (MNCs) traditionally dominated these 
industries, which were quite profitable when organized as corespective oligopolies in the rapid 
growth environment of the post-war Golden Age. Most chose not to exit even as competitive 
pressures mounted, because they had enormous investments in physical, human and 
organizational capital that were firm- and industry-specific. But firms from upwardly mobile 
countries have to enter such industries in order for both firms and countries to move up the 
technology ladder and thereby accelerate economic development. To decide to stay out of all key 
global manufacturing markets is thus to choose to remain under-developed. The result: exit is too 
small, and entry too large to eliminate industry excess capacity. 
 
If it were known in advance which firms would ultimately lose the struggle for survival, 
the losers would quickly exit to cut their losses. And those who are demonstrably weaker than 
their opponents often do leave. But given the importance of many of these markets, the huge 
irreversible costs required to enter and thrive in them, and the equally huge assured loss upon 
exit, most competitors try to ‘stay in the game’ even as competition mounts, hoping to survive 
the current struggle and reap the secure, above-average profits expected to emerge when the 
eventual winners re-oligopolize the industry. This is not an irrational choice. 
 
But it takes sustained investment to remain competitive in these industries. This 
phenomenon is called “coerced investment” in Crotty 1993. Price-profit pressures force firms 
that have decided to ‘stay in the game’ to build plants where labor and other costs are cheapest 
and market growth strongest. They invest to shed and more tightly control labor, to gain 
economies of scale and scope, to develop new products and new models of old products, and to 
acquire best-practice technology for both cost reduction and quality reasons. Finally, they invest 
to get inside the borders of expected high growth developing markets such as China. 
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Many of Korea’s chaebol were eventually able to penetrate important global industries 
and move up the technology ladder in the decades after 1961, helping Korea prosper. They can 
hardly be criticized as “irrational” because they tried to both build upon and protect their 
accumulated human and physical capital through continued investment, even at times when 
current market signals were not attractive. Giant Northern MNCs were doing precisely the same 
thing at the same time. In the mid 1990s chaebol leaders did form grandiose plans to become 
dominant players in the global economy, plans that had enthusiastic government support. But it 
is important to keep in mind that these plans were not formulated in a vacuum and that over-
investment was not a peculiarly Korean phenomenon – consider the massive over-investment in 
information and communication industries in the US in the late 1990s. The tendency toward 
seemingly excessive investment in key global industries is built into the structures of global 
capitalism in the slow growth neoliberal era.9  
 
In addition, until the late 1980s, the government had limited the extent to which rival 
chaebol firms could enter and compete in each other’s domestic markets and maintained 
constraints on inward foreign direct investment as well as on imports. The release of these 
constraints and protections added to the intensity of competition in many Korean industries (See 
Chang, Park and Yoo 1998). 
 
Second, rising investment by Korean firms in the mid 1990s was a response to very 
positive market signals. Real domestic demand grew slowly in 1993, but it rose rapidly from 
1994 through 1996. As shown below, operating profit rates and operating profits as a percent of 
sales were more than adequate through 1995. Moreover, capacity utilization in manufacturing in 
1994 and 1995 was higher than in any year in the 1980s. In addition, since the outbreak of labor 
militancy in the late 1980s led to a rising labor share of income, an increase in labor-saving 
investment was understandable. As a result of this investment, labor productivity growth was 
very high and labor costs were under control in manufacturing in the 1990s. This can be seen in 
Graph 1. 
 
The most severe criticism of investment irrationality was leveled at those chaebol firms 
engaged in competition in the key manufacturing industries mentioned above. The OECD’s 1998 
report on Korea specifically condemns investment in semiconductors, steel, consumer durables, 
autos and petrochemicals – mainstays of Korea post-1998 export growth (1998, pp. 23 and 26).  
According to the OECD, Korean firms should have left the field of battle in these industries, 
where they had spent decades developing their competitive capacities, presumably so that North 
American, European and Japanese MNCs could operate in peace there.  
 
A serious problem with the OECD’s position is that Korea’s exports were booming in the 
mid 1990s. Total exports rose from $82 billion in 1993 to $125 billion in 1995, growing by 17% 
in 1994 and 30% in 1995. This superb growth in exports was concentrated in precisely the heavy 
industries that the OECD, looking backward in 1998, thought Korea should have exited.  
 
The boom of the mid 1990s came to an end in Korea in large part because it was hit with 
a severe negative export ‘shock’ in 1996 that set the stage for the crisis in late 1997. Export 
growth in Asia fell dramatically: in volume terms, export growth in the region rose by 15% in 
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1994 and 18% in 1995, but it fell to 6% in 1996. The dollar value of Korean exports, which had 
grown by over 50% from 1993 to 1995, rose by a mere 4% in 1996. Heavy industry exports, 
which were at the core of Korean manufacturers’ development plans, showed no growth in 1996 
after averaging 35% annual growth in the previous two years.  
 
Korean manufacturing firms naturally planned for a continuation of the ongoing export 
boom and invested accordingly; thus, they were hit hard by the export shock in 1996 -- a shock 
no one had predicted. The rate of growth of manufacturing sales revenue in 1996 fell by half 
from its rapid 1995 pace (OECD 1998, p. 176). The export shock cut profits dramatically in 
1996. In previous decades, when the economy was hit by negative export or exchange value 
shocks that caused many firms to become illiquid, the state saw to it that credit remained 
available at reasonable rates, and that aggregate demand growth was quickly restored to healthy 
levels. Thus, widespread illiquidity did not become general insolvency, even in the Great 
Recession of the early 1980s, as it did in 1998. But this time the state was unwilling or unable to 
play its traditional role. 
  
 Many firms had major ongoing investment projects that it was uneconomical for them not 
to complete. This is part of a general tendency in investment spending: “the rate of capital 
formation displays considerable inertia” (Kopke and Brauman 2001, p. 4). “Many 
investments…have long lead times and come to market even when they are no longer needed” 
(Wall Street Journal, “Long a Drag on the Economy, Capacity Glut Begins to Ebb,” September 
8, 2003, p. 1). But with the collapse of profitability, firms had to borrow virtually all the funds 
they needed to finance investment, raising financial fragility. Foreign banks would only lend 
short-term to lower their risk and the Korean government had deregulated only short, not long-
term foreign borrowing. Since short-term rates on foreign loans were quite low, Korean firms 
found them attractive. The stage was thus set in 1996 for the catastrophe of late 1997.  
 
When we combine the ongoing need to invest to ‘stay in the game,’ the pressure to lower 
labor costs through mechanization, positive export and domestic market signals, and the oceans 
of relatively low interest loans foreign banks made available to Korea (that came with a promise 
that the bank’s would roll these loans over indefinitely), the decision to raise investment in heavy 
industry in 1993-96 is understandable ex ante.  
 
However, we do not mean to suggest that investment decisions in this period were above 
criticism. Even ex ante, the size and speed of the investment response to positive market signals 
were excessive in some cases, reflecting the optimism – even arrogance – of chaebol leaders, 
who over-reacted to the increased intensity of global competition signaled by the extended web 
of recent WTO agreements.10 And there is no doubt that by the mid 1990s the large chaebol 
groups had become excessively diversified, though there is disagreement as to the importance of 
this problem. Most important, the heavy reliance on short-term foreign loans to finance risky 
long-term investment projects made possible by the weakening of short-term capital controls was 
potentially catastrophic, and this is so obvious that it should have been clear ex ante.  
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Capital Productivity and Related Issues 
 
One important aspect of the ex post neoliberal attack on the traditional Korean model was 
the argument that over-investment and misallocated investment in the 1990s caused a rapid 
decline in capital productivity. The output to capital ratio (OCR) was alleged to have fallen 
dramatically in the 1990s to a disastrously low level as a result of economic mismanagement.  
 
It is crucial to understand that successful East Asian development models will create a 
significant decline in the OCR in their early decades. The general result of successful 
development in this model is a rise in capital per worker (K/L) that is much more rapid than in 
countries that develop slowly. A simple exercise with a neoclassical production function shows 
that, ceteris paribus, as K/L rises, output per unit of capital (Y/K) falls. The payoff is a fast-paced 
increase in labor productivity (Y/L) that makes possible rapidly rising per capita income.  
 
The best Korean source on capital–output ratio data is provided by the Korean 
Development Institute (KDI). Graph 2 shows the Y/K series for manufacturing from 1970 
through 1997. From 1988 through 1997 there is a substantial decline in `Y/K, from .60 to .42. 
This was undoubtedly the result of a rapid increase in the rate of investment that boosted K/L 
substantially. For the economy as a whole, gross domestic investment as a percent of GDP, 
which was about 30% from 1981-87, rose to 36% for the period from 1988 through 1997. 
However, almost all the decline in the OCR took place before the1993-96 investment boom. (The 
additional deterioration in 1997 and 1998 were caused by a slowdown followed by a collapse of 
real GDP growth.) Until the export shock of 1996 and the onset of crisis that followed, Y/K 
appeared to have stabilized at about .44 in response to the higher trend rate of capital 
accumulation. Graph 3 presents a quadratic approximation to the Y/K series that represents its 
long-term trend. It suggests that the mid-1990s were compatible with the general trend of Y/K 
across three decades. 
 
As noted above, the decline in the OCR over this period was the result of three factors 
that increased the already high rate of capital accumulation. First, the sharp rise in labor 
militancy that accompanied the uprising against the military dictatorship in 1987-88 caused the 
wage share of value added in manufacturing to rise from 47% in 1987 to 54% in 1991-92. With 
the exception of 1995, it remained over 50% until 1997 (BOK, Financial Statement Analysis for 
Manufacturing Firms, various years).11 This made labor-saving investment attractive to chaebol 
leaders. Second, profitable market signals in the mid 1990s stimulated a burst of investment. 
Third, the end of government investment regulation unleashed a burst of pent-up chaebol 
investment demand.  
 
Graph 4 presents time series data on economy-wide OCRs for a number of countries. 
The data show that all fast-developing Asian countries show a large decline in Y/K in their 
decades of rapid development. Taiwan stands out because it had a relatively high level of Y/K in 
the 1990s even after experiencing a substantial decline in Y/K in its early stages of development.   
 
Given that Korea had a high rate of capital accumulation over decades that did cause a 
substantial decline over time in its Y/K ratio, did it also gain the rapid increase in labor 
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productivity that was one of its central goals? The rate of output per worker rose by a spectacular 
average rate of 8% per year from 1961 through 1996, and the Penn World data tables show that 
from 1960 to 1997, Korea had the second highest rate of growth of per capita real GDP in the 
world. So the answer is obviously yes. But we are most interested in the 1990s performance. 
Data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that output per hour in Korea’s 
manufacturing sector rose by 10.5% per year from 1993 through 1997, faster than their 8% rate 
of growth in the boom years from 1986-1991 (BLS 2001). They also show that output per work 
hour grew significantly faster than real compensation per hour, suggesting that Korean 
manufacturing firms avoided a wage squeeze on profits in the mid 1990s through labor-saving 
investment. Both these conclusions are consistent with Korean National Statistical Office (NSO) 
data for manufacturing and all-industries, as can be seen in Graphs 1 and 5.  
 
The results of a recent study of long-run economic performance in Korea and Taiwan by 
Timmer and van Ark (2000) are consistent with the picture presented here. They estimate that 
capital per worker in Korean manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 1.9%, 9.2% and 11% in 
1963-73, 1973-85, and 1983-96 respectively (p. 19). This led to annual increases in value-added 
per work hour of 7.6%, 5.8%, and 7.9% in these periods. Results for the whole economy are 
similar. 
 
It has often been argued (see Krugman 1994) that Korea generated spectacular gains in 
productivity and per capita income in the decades following the military coup in 1961 only 
because it rapidly raised the rate of national saving and investment. It was not able to generate 
much technical progress. Tests of this proposition rely on the measurement of total factor 
productivity (TPF), a particularly treacherous endeavor. Estimates by the IMF (IMF 2001, p. 8) 
show the average annual TFP growth for the Korea economy as a whole over the period 1970-99 
to be 2.1%. In the investment boom of 1986-91, annual TFP growth was 3.2%, while the 
investment boom of 1993-96 showed a TFP growth of 2.5%. In the heart of the mid 90s boom, 
from 1994 through 1996, TFP growth was 2.9%, slightly lower than in the 1980s boom, but quite 
good nonetheless. The paper concludes: “Korea’s [total factor] productivity performance has 
been striking. Accumulation of physical and human capital has been rapid, but does not seem to 
have been so excessive as to lead to decreasing returns…” (p. 9). A 2003 IMF study finds that 
average annual Korean TFP growth is about the same as in other OECD countries (IMF 2003b, 
40). It also finds that TFP growth from 1990-96 is about equal to the long-term average from 
1980-2002.  
 
Bosworth and Collins examined the question of whether the ‘miracle’ of the East Asia 
economies should be attributed solely to capital deepening. For Korea, they estimate that output 
per worker grew at a rate of 5.7% per year from 1960-1994, while TFP growth was 1.5% 
annually over the same period. However, from 1984-94, productivity rose at a rate of 6.2% per 
year, while TFP growth, at 2.1% per year, was almost twice as rapid as in the preceding decade 
(1996, p. 157). Finally, Timmer and van Ark (2000) show that TFP growth in Korea in 1985-96, 
at 2.3% per year, was substantially higher than in the period from 1963-85 (p. 13).12  
 
The data on Korean capital efficiency are thus broadly consistent with our expectation of 
a modest decline in economic efficiency in the 1990s as the result of inappropriate liberalization, 
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but not with the ‘total-collapse’ thesis required to justify US and IMF actions in the wake of the 
crisis. 
 
Measures of Profitability in the mid 1990s Investment Boom 
 
In an idealized neoclassical market economy, profitability is the best measure of 
enterprise economic efficiency. In real world economies, profit can be raised or lowered by many 
things unrelated to enterprise efficiency -- shifts in market power, changes in exchange rates, 
and, most important, fluctuations in demand and excess capacity.   
 
There are many ways to measure profitability; each suffers from significant measurement 
problems. The most important question is: are profits gross or net of payments for financial 
capital the best index of the economic efficiency of the firm and the economy? The correct 
answer depends on whether one is primarily interested in the efficiency of real-sector resource 
allocation -- the key determinant of long-term development -- or in the likelihood of a wave of 
bankruptcies or a systemic financial crisis. These are distinct questions that unfortunately were 
mixed together in most analyses of the causes of the Korean financial crisis. 
 
If real-sector resource allocation becomes severely dysfunctional, questions about the 
long-term viability of the economic system are appropriate, but if an otherwise effective real-
sector allocation process is temporarily rendered vulnerable because of a dangerous mode of 
finance, then it is primarily the financial system – not the whole economy -- that needs 
overhauling.  
 
Operating profits, which are measured prior to the deduction of interest payments, are a 
more appropriate indicator of the firm’s real-sector efficiency -- its effectiveness in converting 
scarce resources into products valued by buyers -- than ordinary profits, which are measured net 
of interest payments and other factors.  The interest cost deduction used in the construction of 
ordinary profits is affected by many things that have nothing to do with enterprise efficiency. To 
take an obvious example, if the Central Bank intervenes to raise interest rates, ordinary profits 
drop for all firms even though their basic economic efficiency is unchanged. Or consider two 
otherwise identical firms, one of which is heavily leveraged and the other is debt free. The debt 
free firm will have a much higher ordinary profit rate. There are many reasons why the interest 
rate is not an accurate measure of the opportunity cost to the economy of the use of resources by 
the firm. For example, in the ‘miracle’ years from 1970-96, there were only two years in which 
the return on assets for Korean manufacturers (measured by ordinary profit plus interest as a 
percent of total assets) exceeded the average loan rate 
 
This is not to say that an ordinary profitability measure is not essential to an analysis of 
the causes of the 1997 crisis. On the contrary, it is the best index of potential bankruptcy at the 
micro level and potential financial crisis at the macro level. Our general position is that Korea 
suffered a crisis in 1997 not because firms were economically inefficient (as measured by 
operating profit), but because too many firms relied on short-term foreign credit to finance 
investment, credit that was quite likely to evaporate at the first sign of serious financial trouble.  
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Domestic Profit Time Series 
 
Was there a collapse in profitability for Korean firms in the mid 1990s as a result of a 
breakdown of the Korean economic system? We focus on a comparison between the investment 
boom of 1986-91, a period when the Korean ‘miracle’ had not yet been questioned, and 1993-96, 
when the economy is alleged to have broken down.  
 
Since there are serious measurement problems in the construction of the capital stock 
estimates needed to calculate profit rates, the first profitability indicator we examine is profit as a 
percent of sales. Graph 6 shows both operating and ordinary profit as a percent of sales for 
manufacturing from 1970 through 1997. The former series has a key advantage over the 
operating profit rate shown below, because financial payments are excluded from the numerator 
and financial assets are excluded from the denominator – it is thus directly influenced only by 
real-sector variables. This profit index cycles around an average rate of 7.5% from the early 
1970s through 1986. From 1986 through 1989, it declines from 7.9% to 6%, in large part because 
of the rise in the wage share following the labor unrest of 1987-88. It then increases every year 
from 1990 through 1995 -- at which point, at 8.3%, it matches its post-1973 peak.  
 
Profitability declined in 1996 due to the precipitous drop in the growth of exports, but it 
rose again in 1997 to over 8%-- higher than any year in the late 1970s and 1980s. It took Korean 
firms a number of years to adjust to the jump in labor’s share after the late 1980s and the 
slowdown in global growth in the early 1990s, but by the mid 1990s profitability was rising as 
exports boomed, and had achieved levels not seen in two decades. There is no evidence of 
economic breakdown here.  
 
The ordinary profit series is unstable because the main adjustments it makes to operating 
profits  -- for interest charges, for gains or losses from financial assets, and for changes in the 
exchange rate – are volatile. It shows a drop in profitability after 1978, a result of both the spike 
in oil prices in the late 1970s and high interest rates and global recession in the early 1980s. It is 
higher in 1986-88, partly due to lower interest rates and oil prices. Profitability declined 
thereafter through 1992, then rose in 1993, 1994 and 1995, where, at 3.6%, it was higher than 
any year in 1974-95 other than 1988. It drops in the export shock of 1996 and falls to below zero 
in 1997 even though operating profit as a percent of sales rose to 8.3%. The problem here is 
obviously not efficiency in the real sector, but the onset of a financial and currency crisis. Net 
interest costs, at 4.9% of sales, were 0.6% higher than in 1996, and the loss from the collapsing 
won leapt to 3.1% of sales from 0.4% the preceding year. 
 
Both series indicate that profitability was rising rapidly in the mid 1990s investment 
boom, and that by 1995 profitability was near a two decade high. The key difference is that the 
ordinary profit series signals the county’s vulnerability to financial crisis in 1997, whereas the 
operating profit series tells us only that real-sector efficiency had a temporary decline in 1996. 
Together they suggest that the origin of the crisis was primarily financial, the result of 
destructive liberalization. 
 
 Graph 7 shows three different estimates of the profit rate on total assets (defined as the 
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sum of real and financial assets). There are two serious problems with this index: estimates of the 
capital stock are notoriously unreliable, and the denominator mixes real and financial variables in 
a period of financial instability.  
 
In the 1980s, ordinary profit plus interest payments as a percent of assets-- an 
approximation of the operating profit rate -- cycles around an average value of 9.6%. It declines 
from its peak of 10.5% in 1988 to a low of 7.3% in 1993. But it then rises again, hitting 9.5% in 
1995, before falling to 6.4% in 1996, the year of the export shock, and to 5.4% in 1997 as losses 
from the collapsing exchange rate mounted. Large chaebol firms were more profitable than 
average. We know that the rate of return on assets for top 5 chaebol manufacturing firms was 
higher in 1995 than in any year in the1986-91investment boom (Krueger and Yoo 2001, 
Appendix 6). The time profile of the series on ordinary profits over assets is quite similar. A 
rational Korean firm extrapolating the 1993-95 data from either series to create expectations 
about future profitability would have been quite optimistic. (We also present a series of ordinary 
profit over equity, but the main thing this series reflects is the volatility of the equity variable.)  
 
The profit time series suggest that efficiency as measured by average profitability was 
lower in the 1990s than in the preceding decade – an outcome caused primarily by the 
destruction of the traditional model. But as of 1995 the decline was modest and appeared to be 
evaporating. The drop-off in 1996 was largely due to the unforeseen and exogenous export 
shock, and the sharp decline in ordinary profitability in 1997 to exchange rate losses and rising 
interest payments. As the operating profitability series demonstrates, the crisis could not have 
been caused by a collapse of real-sector efficiency.  
 
Cross-Country Profitability Comparisons 
 
Another way to address the question of Korea’s economic performance in the 1990s is by 
comparing it with that of other countries that were not targets of US-IMF demands for radical 
neoliberal restructuring. 
 
There are some post-crisis studies that argue that Korean firms had lower profitability 
and higher indebtedness than firms in most other countries, and this was the cause of the crisis. 
For example, Claessens et. al. 2000 compare rates of return on assets (ROA) for a sample of 
firms in Korea and many other nations. However, there are several questionable measurement 
procedures in the work, especially concerning the adjustment of ROAs for inflation. Using local 
currencies, they find a low ROA for Korean firms (so low they seem incompatible with Korea’s 
high growth rates of GDP and productivity), but using the US dollar, they find that Korean firms 
had a higher ROA than the US. In a World Bank Working Paper whose main thesis is that 
“crony capitalism was at the core of the crisis,” Pomerlano 1998 finds that the pre-tax return on 
capital employed in a sample of Korean firms from 1992-96 was actually higher than that 
achieved in France and Germany and equal to that of Taiwan and Singapore.  
 
Graph 8 shows operating profits as a percent of sales for Korea, Taiwan, the United 
States, and Japan from 1971 through 1997. (Taiwanese data end in 1995.) On this preferred 
efficiency criterion, Korea is the best performer of the group over the 26 years of the sample. If 
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we look only at the 1990s, we find that Korean firms had significantly higher profitability than 
US firms every year of the decade except 1996.  Korea also did better than Taiwan in five of the 
six years for which data is available, and better than Japan in every year from 1990-97. Japan 
clearly was struggling with economic problems in the 1990s, but the US is the world’s most 
advanced economy, and Taiwan is rightly considered to have a great development record. The 
fact that Korea had a better profit record than both these countries is very strong evidence indeed 
that it was not structurally dysfunctional in this period. As Chang and Park put it: “Korean firms 
do not have low profitability by international standards and have done as well as, or even better 
than, the US firms which they are constantly asked to emulate” (Chang and Park 1999, p. 11). 
 
Graph 9 shows ordinary profit as a percent of sales. By this criterion, firms in Taiwan 
and the US, which have much lower leverage and interest rates than Korean firms, do best. 
Ironically, using this index of profitability, it is the US, not Korea, that looks like a ‘miracle’ 
economy, even though the period after the early 1970s was, on average, one of dismal economic 
performance in the US. But even with this less-preferred measure of real-sector efficiency, there 
is no evidence that Korea’s relative performance versus the US and Taiwan from 1990 through 
1995 was worse than it had been in previous decades.  
 
Graph 10 shows operating profit over assets for Korea, the US and Japan. (Korea’s 
operating profits are again proxied by ordinary profit plus interest payments.) The Korean profit 
rate exceeds that of both countries in every year from 1982 through 1995. Graph 11 shows 
ordinary profit as a percent of the value of assets for the same three countries plus Japan. As the 
country with the highest leverage and highest interest rates, Korea does poorly in the 
comparison. However, in the late 1980s through 1995 the gap between Korea and the others is 
relatively low.  
 
The cross-country profitability comparisons shown here are important to the general 
debate about the condition of the Korean economy in the 1990s. After the onset of the crisis in 
1997, most Western economists concluded that the collapse was caused by the breakdown of 
Korea’s resource allocation process. Yet Korea’s overall performance in the 1980s and 1990s 
was not compared with that of more neoliberal economies such as Brazil or Argentina or Mexico 
or Chile, but rather with the perfect allocation process of neoliberal systems as depicted in 
neoclassical theory. There is no actually existing, relatively open, free-market developing 
country that can come close to matching Korea’s long-term dynamic efficiency. The Korean 
people were thus dragged onto a dangerous economic development path after 1997 by the US, 
the IMF, and representatives of chaebol interests, not because of solid evidence that actually 
existing neoliberal countries performed better than Korea – none did! Rather, the radical 
neoliberal restructuring of the economy, forced on Korea’ people by non-democratic means, was 
often justified by the thesis that a fairy tale economy that exists only in neoclassical theory was 
superior to the Korean model.  
 
V. Econometric Evidence 
 
In this section, we present econometric evidence relevant to the debate about real-sector 
allocative efficiency in Korea prior to the crisis. Some caveats are in order before we begin.  
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First, for key firms in the large chaebol groups that were, along with Korean workers, the 
direct producers of the Korean ‘miracle,’ the main challenge over time was to create competence 
in industries that did not yet exist in Korea. Rather than passively respond to indicators of static 
comparative advantage, they tried to create dynamic comparative advantage (see Amsden 1989). 
To do this, firms had to make major investments over long time periods during which sales and 
profits in the new industry were meager -- at best. When successful, the profits came along well 
after the investments were made. Investment econometrics thus cannot adequately test the 
efficiency of this crucial aspect of Korean development.  
 
Second, as noted, in some periods Korean firms were forced to engage in defensive or 
‘coerced’ investment to avoid being forced out of crucial export industries that were 
experiencing spells of excess capacity, price wars and low profits. Such investment will be 
deemed ‘irrational’ in neoclassical interpretations of investment econometrics because it tends to 
be high just when profitability signals are poor.  
 
Third, Korea was one of the East Asian models in which banks were the dominant 
mediator between savers and investors. Thus, rapidly rising investment was funded primarily by 
debt and the most successful Korean firms had very high leverage. High indebtedness thus did 
not demonstrate poor planning or inefficient resource allocation. And it did not cause banks to 
ration credit to firms. Therefore, we should not expect indices of leverage such as debt-equity 
ratios to play the same role in investment econometrics using Korean data as they do with, for 
example, US data. (Moreover, the fact that Korean firms were highly levered suggests an 
important lesson for the appropriate ‘sequencing’ of financial liberalization. Even those who 
believed that financial liberalization was the right long-term policy for Korea should have 
understood that liberalization could not be implemented effectively until after firm leverage had 
been dramatically reduced. To liberalize before reducing leverage was to invite financial crisis.) 
 
For these reasons, tests of allocative efficiency based on investment econometrics cannot 
be definitive. They are simply one more source of information we can add to the data on capital 
productivity and profitability already examined. 
 
The Korean investment econometric literature 
 
There are many recent econometric studies of micro economic performance in Korea. 
(See Borensztein and Lee 1999, Joh 1999 and 2000, Lee, Ryu and Yoon 2000, Hahn 2000, Shin 
and Park 1999, Chang and Choi 1988, Chang and Hong 2000, Chang 2003, and Lee et. al. 2000), 
but only a few of them are based on investment performance. Most focus on alleged weaknesses 
of the chaebol conglomerates rather than on a general collapse in the efficiency of resource 
allocation in Korea in the mid 1990s. They argue that chaebol firms invested more than they 
should have in the period preceding the crisis, and were more indebted and less profitable than 
non-chaebol firms. The advantages associated with chaebol membership – access to group 
finance and technical and managerial expertise as well as economies of scale and scope – were 
found to be smaller in the 1990s than in previous decades.  
 
 
 25
These recent studies conflict with some pre-crisis analyses of the Korean. For example, 
the 1996 OECD economic survey of Korea made the following observation about the efficiency 
of chaebol groups: 
 
The concentration of economic power [in chaebol groups] is criticized as leading to an 
inefficient allocation of resources by these groups, which are thought to be too broadly 
diversified. However, this concern is not supported empirically; the productivity of 
subsidiaries of the chaebol is higher on average than that of independent firms. …The 
diversification of the chaebol would not appear to be irrational. (1996, p. 116) 
 
We do not dispute the assertion that the high indebtedness of many of the smaller chaebol 
left them in a precarious financial position after the collapse in export growth in 1996 and the 
drying up of foreign bank loans in late 1997, or that chaebol firms invested more than non-
chaebol firms. But is important to understand that this literature pictures a gradual decline in 
chaebol efficiency. It thus cannot be used to support the thesis that the resource allocation 
process suddenly broke down in the mid 1990s. The theories used in the literature also fail to 
provide any insight into the reasons for the thirty-five year long Korean ‘miracle.’ 
 
There is some confusion concerning the proper interpretation of investment econometric 
results for Korea. One common specification shows investment/K as a function of sales/K and 
cash-flow/K and its lagged value (where K is the value of the stock of capital). Here Sales/K is 
the independent variable thought to reflect the ‘efficiency’ or productivity of investment – a 
measure of the value of the marginal product of capital. Cash-flow/K is normally used to 
measure the likelihood that the firm is finance constrained in the short run. (See Fazzari et al. 
1988; Laeven 2000; Love 2001, and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 1991). The debt-to-capital 
ratio is added as an index of the long-term financial problems. Some regressions add profit/K as 
an independent variable. It is, of course, highly correlated with cash-flow/K, but profit/K is not 
just an index of possible finance constraints. It is also an index of the average efficiency of 
investment allocation over time.  
 
Now, suppose that investment function regressions indicate that the coefficient on 
profit/K declines and/or becomes less significant over time. Does this mean that firms are less 
finance constrained, or that investment is less responsive to market efficiency signals, or both? 
The first interpretation may be seen as a positive development, while the second suggests a 
serious breakdown in economic efficiency. This problem will be addressed further in the 
discussion of our results.  
 
It is also unclear whether operating profits (most closely related to efficiency) or ordinary 
profits (a better indicator of the likelihood of binding finance constraints) or cash-flow should be 
used in the regressions. We use operating profit or its approximation as ordinary profit plus 
interest payments here, but the use of ordinary profit or a traditional cash-flow index (such as 
ordinary profit plus depreciation) yields qualitatively similar results. 
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Industry-level investment equations in the manufacturing sector 
 
The industry-level data used in this section are taken from a data set for the 
manufacturing sector published by the BOK. We use a model similar to the one used in the 
industry investment econometrics in Borenzstein and Lee 1999. We ask two related questions. 
Was investment decision-making in the pre-crisis period ‘irrational’ – not strongly influenced by 
the ‘fundamentals’ defined in this literature? And, was it significantly less responsive to 
economic fundamentals (as proxied by variables used in the literature) than it had been in the 
‘miracle’ decades of the 1970s and 1980s. We rely primarily on ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
OLS with dummy variables, but we also use two fixed-effects panel-data models to check for 
consistent inter-industry or inter-firm differences.  
 
We begin in Table 1 with results for all manufacturing industries from 1972-90. (Industry 
regressions use the annual rate of growth of sales rather than S/K because there is no available 
data series for the industry-level capital stock.) All four regressions indicate that investment 
responded significantly to the profit rate, and three of the four regressions show a significant 
response to sales growth. There is no evidence of investment inefficiency in this period.  
 
As interpreted in the literature, the significance of the profit rate implies that most 
industries were finance constrained. However, we know this was not the case for the large-
chaebol firms that did most of the investing. The lack of significance of the debt ratio may result 
from the fact that the largest and fastest growing firms relied on debt to fund most of their 
investment. Thus, the negative relation normally assumed between debt and the willingness of 
market-oriented banks to lend (or the desire of highly indebted firms to avoid the risk associated 
with investment) is likely to be balanced by the positive relation between debt and investment 
emanating from the firm’s budget constraint. In Korea’s East Asian model, rising investment was 
accompanied by rising debt.  
 
Model 1: 
 
(Fixed asset growth)t = a + b* (profit rate)t-1 +  c* (sales growth)t + d* (debt ratio)t-1 + e  
 
Profit rate (ordinary profit plus interest payments) 
Debt ratio: debt / capital 
 
Table 2 contains results for these same regressions in the immediate pre-crisis years of 
1993-97 that are at the center of the dispute about the ultimate cause of Korea’s crisis. 
Investment decision making in this period appears to have been even more tightly tied to 
economic ‘fundamentals’ than in previous decades. R-squares are higher and the coefficients of 
profits and sales are not only reasonably consistent across regression models, they are more 
statistically significant than in Table 1. The two fixed-effects regressions fail the F-test, but this 
presumably indicates only that there were no significant and consistent inter-industry differences 
in investment behavior.  
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Table 1. Industry-Level Manufacturing Investment Regressions (1972-1990) 
 
Dependent variable: fixed asset growth rate 
 
 Simple OLS OLS With 
year dummies 
Panel: One-
way Fixed 
effects 
Panel: Two-
way Fixed 
effects 
Intercept 1.57 
(0.74) 
8.61 
(1.43) 
1.20 
(0.23) 
9.00 
(1.39) 
Profit rate 1.60*** 
(4.02) 
1.02** 
(2.48) 
2.30***
(5.47) 
1.73*** 
(3.90) 
Sales growth 0.21*** 
(4.20) 
0.13* 
(1.93) 
0.19***
(3.89) 
0.10 
(1.54) 
Debt ratio -0.03 
(-0.26) 
-0.04 
(-0.35) 
-0.06 
(-0.46) 
-0.02 
(-0.17) 
Adjusted-R 
square 
0.192 0.300 0.311 0.479 
# of 
observations 
152 152 152 152 
 
Note:  
1) For all Tables: t-value in ( ): * implies significance at the 90% level, ** at 95% and 
*** at 99%. 
2) The industry classification changes slightly after 1991. 
3) For all Tables: Year dummies not reported. 
4) Both panel tests pass the F- test at the 95% level. 
 
While an exercise such as this is hardly definitive, it does suggest that manufacturing 
firms in the 1993-97 period were acting sensibly in their investment decisions according to 
standard criteria, and that there was no deterioration in the rationality of their investment 
decisions relative to preceding decades. 
 
Table 3 covers the entire decade of the 1990s, including the sluggish early years, the fast 
growth middle years, the onset of crisis, the collapse of 1998 in the wake of the IMF takeover 
and the rebound of 1999-2000. The combination of such disparate sub-periods would be 
expected to yield incoherent regression results, but even here we find that investment continues 
to respond appropriately to independent variables. It seems likely that the efficiency of the real-
sector allocation process must have deteriorated to some extent in the chaotic final years of the 
period, but even in this turmoil, the investment process as represented in this model appears to be 
operating effectively – an indication of the underlying strength of the resource allocation system. 
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Table 2. Industry-Level Manufacturing Investment Regressions  (1993-1997) 
 
Dependent variable: fixed asset growth rate 
 
 Simple OLS OLS with year 
dummies 
Panel: One-
way Fixed 
effects 
Panel: Two-
way Fixed 
effects 
Intercept -4.77 
(-1.23) 
-7.50** 
(-2.01) 
-6.44 
(-1.11) 
-9.04 
(-1.59) 
Profit rate 1.62*** 
(3.98) 
1.72***
(4.29) 
1.48***
(2.90) 
1.67*** 
(3.05) 
Sales growth 0.49*** 
(5.52) 
0.64***
(6.39) 
0.30***
(2.74) 
0.43*** 
(3.06) 
Debt ratio 0.00 
(0.30) 
0.00 
(0.51) 
0.01 
(1.40) 
0.01 
(1.34) 
Adjusted-R 
square 
0.319 0.403 0.462 0.532 
# of 
observations 
105 105 105 105 
 
Note: Panel regressions did not pass the F-test. 
 
Table 3. Industry-Level Manufacturing Investment Regressions   (1991-2000) 
 
Dependent variable: fixed asset growth rate 
 
 Simple OLS OLS with year 
dummies 
Panel: One-
way Fixed 
effects 
Panel: Two-
way Fixed 
effects 
Intercept 1.32 
(0.47) 
-5.52* 
(-1.82) 
-3.91 
(-0.81) 
-7.49 
(-1.65) 
Profit rate 1.03*** 
(4.80) 
0.95***
(3.67) 
1.22***
(4.03) 
1.07*** 
(3.60) 
Sales growth 0.23*** 
(3.87) 
0.33***
(5.10) 
0.15** 
(2.17) 
0.25*** 
(3.05) 
Debt ratio 0.01 
(1.45) 
0.00 
(0.50) 
0.01 
(2.11) 
0.00 
(0.90) 
Adjusted-R 
square 
0.121 0.308 0.192 0.395 
# of 
observations 
210 210 210 210 
 
Note: Panel with one-way fixed effects did not pass the F-test. 
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Firm-level investment in the mid 1990s 
 
Since we only have access to firm-level data for the 1990s, we cannot do cross decade 
comparisons. Table 4 analyses the investment behavior of all firms listed on the Korean stock 
market from 1993-97. (The data source is National Information and Credit Evaluation, Inc.)13 
This is the period in which, according to neoliberals, Korean firms became disastrously 
inefficient. Yet the coefficients of both the profit rate and sales are of the correct sign and are 
statistically significant at the one percent level in all four regressions. There is no evidence of 
irrational investment decision-making processes here.  
 
Model 2:  
 
(I / K)t = a + b* (Profit/K)t-1+ c* (Sales/K)t  + d* (Debt/K)t-1 + e  
 
I: gross increase of capital stock 
K: the capital stock in the end of the former period 
Profit: operating profit in the former period 
Sales: sales in the current period 
Debt: debt in the former period 
 
Table 4. Firm-level investment regressions for all listed firms (1993-1997). 
 
Dependent variable: (I / K)t  
 
 Simple OLS OLS with year 
and industry 
dummies 
Panel: One-
way Fixed 
effects 
Panel: Two-
way Fixed 
effects 
 
Intercept 0.23*** 
(22.83) 
0.32***
(10.40) 
-0.14 
(-0.84) 
-0.18 
(-0.12) 
Profit rate 0.18*** 
(7.12) 
0.21***
(7.69) 
0.19***
(3.89) 
0.18*** 
(3.59) 
Sales/K 0.01*** 
(4.56) 
0.01***
(3.31) 
0.08***
(9.58) 
0.08*** 
(9.82) 
Debt ratio 0.02*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.01 
(-1.34) 
0.04***
(3.09) 
0.04*** 
(3.21) 
Adjusted-R 
square 
0.038 0.073 0.415 0.411 
# of 
observations 
3415 3415 3415 3415 
 
Note: Both panel tests pass F-test. 
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The regressions represented in Table 5 address the issue dealt with by most econometric 
studies of investment performance in Korea – the difference in investment efficiency between 
chaebol and non-chaebol firms. Our results show a somewhat different investment response 
pattern for firms associated with the top-30 chaebol groups. Profitability loses significance for 
these firms, while sales become even more important than in Table 5. The standard interpretation 
of these results should be that investment by chaebol firms was more responsive to efficiency 
signals and less finance constrained than non-chaebol firms – an interpretation quite flattering to 
chaebol firms. But if we consider profitability to be, at least in part, an efficiency index, we 
might conclude that chaebol firms pursued market growth (as represented by S/K) with less 
regard for short-term efficiency than non-chaebol firms.  
 
The truth may contain elements of both interpretations. We know that the operating 
profitability of the top-30 chaebol was rising rapidly from 1992 through 1995 and that of the 
dominant top-5 chaebol was rising spectacularly in 1994 and 1995 (Krueger and Yoo 2001, 
Table 6). Chaebol firms were likely to have extrapolated this trend to generate optimistic longer-
term market growth expectations. If so, they probably responded by trying to maintain enough 
capacity through investment spending to sustain or raise their market share in the oligopolistic 
industries their key firms operate in. The unexpected export shock and profit rate fall of 1996 
thus hit chaebol firms hard, leaving them with large unfinished investment projects that would be 
too expensive to pull the plug on. As noted in section IV, the “necessitous” investment needed to 
complete the projects probably caused total investment to fail to fall in 1997 as rapidly as the 
profit rate, leading to a weak relation between the two variables. Moreover, since the export 
orientation of chaebol firms is larger on average than that of non-chaebol firms, it was primarily 
the bigger chaebol firms that responded to the huge upsurge in export sales in the mid 1990s by 
accelerating investment at a pace even faster than the rise in the profit rate.  
 
Table 6 shows the results of regressions for all non-chaebol firms. The coefficients on 
sales are quite significant (though not as large as in Table 5), but in contrast to chaebol firms, 
profitability is significant at the one percent level in three of the regressions. This difference 
again creates a problem of interpretation. Given Korea’s pre-crisis financial system, it may be 
that non-chaebol firms were finance constrained in a period with strong incentives to invest 
while chaebol firms were not. Or it might mean that they were more responsive to short-term 
efficiency signals. 
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Table 5. Firm-level investment for firms in the top 30 chaebol (1993-1997) 
 
Dependent variable: (I / K)t  
 
 Simple OLS OLS with year 
and Industry 
dummies 
Panel: One-
way Fixed 
effects 
Panel: Two-
way Fixed 
effects 
Intercept 0.27*** 
(11.60) 
0.43***
(6.90) 
-0.09 
(-0.65) 
-0.06 
(-0.47) 
Profit rate 0.16* 
(1.84) 
0.16 
(1.55) 
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
-0.06 
(-0.49) 
Sales/K 0.06*** 
(4.37) 
0.09***
(4.84) 
0.13***
(3.39) 
0.13*** 
(3.58) 
Debt ratio 0.06*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.07 
(-3.17) 
0.07 
(1.64) 
0.06 
(1.36) 
Adjusted-R 
square 
0.088 0.208 0.449 0.475 
# of 
observations 
406 406 406 406 
 
Note: Both panel regressions pass the F-test. 
 
Table 6. Firm-level investment for non-chaebol firms (1993-1997) 
 
Dependent variable: (I / K)t  
 
 Simple OLS OLS With year 
and industry 
dummies 
Panel: One-
way Fixed 
effects 
Panel: Two-
way Fixed 
effects 
 
Intercept 0.22*** 
(19.91) 
0.27***
(7.55) 
-0.12 
(-0.74) 
-0.19 
(-1.13) 
Profit rate 0.18* 
(6.90) 
0.22***
(7.69) 
0.22***
(4.21) 
0.20*** 
(3.83) 
Sales/K 0.01*** 
(4.38) 
0.01***
(2.74) 
0.07***
(8.94) 
0.08*** 
(9.25) 
Debt ratio 0.02*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.01 
(-1.02) 
0.03 
(2.41) 
0.04*** 
(2.73) 
Adjusted-R 
square 
0.039 0.068 0.406 0.411 
# of 
observations 
3009 3009 3009 3009 
 
Note: Both panel regressions pass the F-test. 
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The econometric evidence presented here supports the following conclusions. Industry 
regressions indicate that investment decision-making was certainly not less efficient or rational 
by neoclassical criteria in the 1990s than it had been in the ‘miracle’ decade of the 1980s. They 
also suggest that investment in the years leading up to the crisis responded appropriately to 
market signals. The all-firm regressions confirm the mid 1990s efficiency conclusion of the 
industry regressions. There is some evidence that in the mid 1990s investment spending by 
chaebol firms was less responsive to profitability signals than that of non-chaebol firms, but this 
may indicate that they chaebol firms were less finance constrained in the midst of a general 
investment boom and they confronted more powerful expansionary stimuli from the export 
sector in this period.14 We do not rule out the possibility that the chaebol over-reacted to some 
degree to the positive investment incentives, but we see no evidence that the overall real-sector 
resource allocation process was dysfunctional. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
Destructive liberalization in the 1990s made the onset of a difficult economic period in 
Korea inevitable. It also created the need for significant reform of state-economy relations. 
Critics of neoliberalism agree with its supporters that changes in key institutions and policies 
were in order. It was the nature of these changes and their timing that was in dispute. The Korean 
political system had achieved only partial democracy after the late 1980s. Control over the 
political process by chaebol leaders stood in the way of genuine popular rule and, as is the case 
in many countries, money bought political influence. Moreover, serious economic problems 
within the chaebol system needed to be resolved. Substitution of broader stakeholder control 
(with government oversight) for domination by families of the chaebol founders is one policy 
that received attention and support. Sensible macro policy could have prevented the financial and 
economic collapse of 1998, and in so doing would have created an environment in which 
necessary alterations in Korea’s economic institutions and practices could have been 
implemented over an extended period of time without unnecessary transition costs. In December 
1997 Jeffrey Sachs claimed that with appropriate IMF support “Korea could probably have got 
by with a modest slowdown in growth, no credit crunch, and a realistic time horizon to complete 
its needed financial reforms” (Financial Times, “IMF is a power unto itself,” December 11, 
1997).  
 
 Prior to the crisis, there was substantial agreement among Koreans that the traditional 
model needed to be more thoroughly democratized, and most Koreans understood that the state-
economy nexus needed to be modernized, largely in response to changes brought on by its 
previous successes -- though there was no consensus about the precise form such change should 
take. However, we know of no evidence that the extreme form of neoliberalism backed by the 
IMF had significant popular support in the mid 1990s. Koreans elected Kim Dae Jung as 
President on December 18, 1997 in large part because “of the three major candidates, Kim was 
the most critical of the IMF bailout” (“Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis,” 
www.stern.nyu. edu/~nroubini/asia/AsianChronology1.html). Clearly, most Koreans favored 
reform, not revolution.   
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We have argued elsewhere (Crotty and Lee 2002) that the IMF knew full well that the 
macro policies it imposed on Korea starting in December 1997 would lead to an economic 
collapse in 1998; an examination of newspaper and business press reports at that time 
demonstrate that everyone knew this. An economic collapse was the sine qua non of the US-IMF 
strategy. If the neoliberal powers had tried to impose their free-market revolution under normal 
conditions, when restructuring might have been most efficient because it would have been easier 
to distinguish between well and poorly run firms and banks, they would have met strong political 
resistance from labor, large segments of the Korean people, and even some sectors of the 
business community.  
 
This is the paradox of neoliberal revolution: efficient restructuring, whether defined 
within or outside the neoliberal paradigm, requires a semblance of economic normalcy. But 
neoliberal policies are so destructive to the perceived interests of the majority of the population, 
particularly in the years immediately following their implementation, that they are extremely 
unpopular. Who would vote for the outcomes that typically follow an IMF takeover:  mass 
unemployment, falling real wages, an assault on trade unions, destruction of welfare programs, 
the elimination of subsidies for the poor, rising inequality, and so on? This was acknowledged by 
Stanley Fischer, IMF First Deputy Managing Director, in 1998. It is the role of the IMF ‘doctors’ 
to administer essential but distasteful medicine to cure sick countries when their own 
government lack the courage to do so, he said. “If the medicine needed to cure its economic 
illness had been sweet, the country would have taken it years ago. Rather the medicine will 
usually be unpleasant… when structural changes have to be made, the losses are often immediate 
and the gains some way off” (Fischer 1998, p. 4).  Thus, radical neoliberal restructuring cannot 
be achieved through democratic processes in normal economic times.15 Only times of crisis and 
chaos, when a panicked public can be led to believe that failure to accept IMF dictates would be 
even more disastrous than their implementation, is it possible for neoliberalism to be victorious 
in countries like Korea that have been reasonably prosperous. Sachs commented that “The 
people most affected by these policies have little knowledge or input. In Korea, the IMF insisted 
that all [three] presidential candidates immediately “endorse” an agreement that they had no part 
in drafting or negotiating – and no time to understand” (Financial Times, “IMF is a power unto 
itself,” December 11, 1997).  
 
In October 1998, Martin Feldstein called attention to a statement by IMF Director Michel 
Camdessus that “the Asian crisis was a ‘blessing in disguise’ because it gave the IMF the 
leverage to force structural policy changes that the national governments would not otherwise 
accept.” Camdessus’ statement, Feldstein said, “is a remarkable confession of the arrogance and 
inappropriateness of the IMF policies” (Wall Street Journal, “Focus on Crisis Management,” 
October 6, 1998, emphasis added). Barry Bosworth argued that the IMF “used the [Asian crisis] 
to force these countries to adopt its own agenda” (1998, p. 83). Former Treasury Secretary Larry 
Summers put the point this way: “Times of financial emergency are times when [outside 
political] leverage is greatest. Times of financial emergency are often moments when there is the 
greatest malleability with respect to structural change” (2001). 
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The sequence of events leading to the IMF takeover in Korea in December 1997 followed 
a well-established pattern. Pressure had been exerted on Korea for decades by G7 nations, the 
IMF and World Bank, and multinational banks and corporations to try to force the country to 
liberalize domestic finance and open its borders without restriction to imports, foreign direct 
investment and money capital inflows. US pressure on Korea, especially to open its financial 
markets, became much more aggressive after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US refused to 
support Korean admission to the OECD until it got its way. The New York Times reported in 
1999 that the US push “for financial liberalization was directed at Asia in particular, largely 
because it was seen as a potential gold mine for American banks and brokerages.” This pressure:  
 
is reflected in an internal three-page Treasury Dept memorandum dated June 20, 1996. 
The memo lays bare the Treasury’s negotiating position, listing priority areas where the 
Treasury is seeking further liberalization. These included letting foreigners buy Korean 
bonds; letting Korean companies borrow abroad both short term and long term; and 
letting foreigners buy Korean stocks more easily. Such steps… would make Korea more 
vulnerable to precisely the kind of panicky outflow of capital that unfolded at the end of 
1997. (New York Times, “How the US Wooed Asia to Let the Cash Flow In,” February 
16, 1999) 
 
When the crisis first hit, Korea’s government did not want to accept the IMF’s extreme 
demands. The initial Korean response to IMF’s long list of structural changes was disbelief and 
shock. The Wall Street Journal quotes IMF Director Michel Camdessus: “Their first response [to 
IMF demands] was to say “You’re crazy; our system works.”  The story continues: “The 
Koreans, convinced by 30 years of rapid growth that they have devised a new industrial model, 
were shocked by such IMF dictates.”  Camdessus told the Korean Finance Minister (in the midst 
of the collapse of the won in December 1997) that  “unless you agree with all the items I have on 
my piece of paper,… there [won’t] be a bailout.”  In addition to insisting that the government 
accept radical neoliberal restructuring before any funds were released to them, Camdessuss also 
demanded that the three presidential candidates “endorse the IMF deal” – which they hadn’t 
seen. The article notes that the IMF was not acting independently in these negotiations: “despite 
their demonstration of power, many IMF officials feel overshadowed by the U.S. Treasury.” 
(Wall Street Journal, “Bitter Medicine,” March 2, 1998) 
 
External neoliberal forces had domestic allies: wealthy families and chaebol leaders also 
wanted freedom from government regulation and the ability to operate without restriction in 
global markets.  In response to these pressures, the government made many promises to 
liberalize over the decades, but it did very little actual liberalizing. However, it finally 
succumbed to rising pressure in the late 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Liberalization led to the financial crisis of 1997. This is a typical sequence: partial 
liberalization in a state-guided developing economy almost always leads in time to a serious 
currency and financial crisis. When this happens, the IMF and World Bank, with the support of 
G7 governments, tell the local government and the public that they will lend the country the 
foreign exchange it needs to survive the crisis, but only if the government agrees to all their 
terms. Should the government refuse to sign the IMF agreement, ‘well-informed’ observers 
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predict a total collapse of the economy. The key link is this process is the claim that the crisis 
occurred because the economy was ‘broken’ or structurally dysfunctional and will self-destruct 
unless the IMF is allowed to take over and put a neoliberal economy in its place. To avoid this 
expected catastrophe, IMF conditionality is accepted by the government and imposed on the 
public.16   
 
Two things distinguished Korea in 1997 from other countries in the developing world 
that have fallen under IMF domination. First, the series of IMF agreements imposed on Korea 
were perhaps the most radical economic transformation ever attempted by the international 
financial institutions – “extreme structural conditionality” in the IMF’s own words. Second, 
Korea was not a stagnating ‘banana republic,’ but one of the most successful developing 
countries in the world. The central argument of this paper is that the Korean economy showed 
reasonable real-sector allocative efficiency in the mid 1990s: though ill-conceived liberalization 
rendered the economy financially fragile, it was no more ‘broken’ than any other OECD 
economy. It needed reform within the tradition of the Korean model through democratization and 
modernization, not its destruction and replacement with a neoliberal model. But IMF officials, 
US politicians and Western ‘experts’ insisted in December 1997 and early 1998 that the Korean 
economy was completely dysfunctional. This combination of this claim with the chaos brought 
on by austerity macro policy in late 1997 and early 1998 helped break popular resistance to 
radical neoliberalism.  
 
This is why the main question addressed in the paper is so important. Was the mid 1990s 
version of the Korean economy so ‘broken’ that it could not be fixed through reform? If the 
answer is yes, then there was a prima facie case for radical restructuring of some sort. If the 
answer is no, as we have argued, then the IMF takeover of Korea should be seen as an 
illegitimate anti-democratic power-play by neoliberal forces to take control of the Korean 
economy and restructure it to meet their own interests rather than the needs of the majority of the 
Korean people. And the proper lesson to be drawn from Korea’s experience is that developing 
countries should resist pressures to liberalize their economies in ways that make them vulnerable 
to banking and currency crises followed by destructive IMF agreements, and in this way 
maintain control over their own economic destiny.   
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GRAPH APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
Graph. 1. Real hourly wage growth vs. labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector 
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Source: Korea Productivity Center, NSO (National Statistics Office). 
 
Note: 
1) Based on new data release from Korea Productivity Center. 
2) For regular workers, in firms with more than 10 workers. 
3) Using CPI growth rate from NSO.
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Graph 2. Capital productivity in Korean manufacturing sector 
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Graph 3. Actual Y/K ratio and quadratic trend 
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Graph 4. Y/K ratio in countries 
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Source: Extended Pennworld table by Marquetti, A. 
http://homepage.newschool.edu/~foleyd/epwt/ 
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Garph. 5. Real wage growth and labor productivity growth in all sectors 
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Graph 6. Profit to sales ratio in the manufacturing sector. 
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Source: BOK. Financial Statements Analysis, various years. 
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Graph 7. Profit relative to assets 
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Source: BOK, Financial Statements Analysis, and Krueger and Yoo (2001) 
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Graph. 8. Operating profit/sales in countries 
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Graph. 9. Ordinary profit/sales in countries 
 
Ordinary profit/sales
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
year
pe
rc
en
t
Korea USA Japan West Germany Taiwan
 
 
Sources: Ibid. 
Note: 
1) For USA, using net profit 
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Graph. 10. Operating profit/assets in countries 
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Source: Ibid. 
Note: 
1) Ordinary profit plus interest payment for Korea 
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Graph. 11. Ordinary profit/assets in countries 
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Note: 
1) Net profit for USA. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1Jeffrey Sachs put it this way: “In the early 1990s, the international investors wanted a way to share in the Asian 
bounty, so they pressed Thailand, South Korea and other countries to open their capital markets” (Far East Asian 
Review, “Missing Pieces,” February 25, 1999).   
2 One cannot help but wonder whether Greenspan’s belief that free-market economies are immune from over-
investment remains intact after the buildup of massive excess capacity that followed the investment boom of the late 
1990s in the US. 
3 This phenomenon of rapidly rising consumer credit has spread across East Asia. For example, consumer credit in 
Thailand grew 40% from 2001-2002 (New York Times, “Has Thailand Recovered From 1997?,” July 25, 2003, p. 
A12). 
4 We refer to the IMF agreements with Korea as a “takeover” for two reasons. First, the Korean people were given 
no opportunity to accept or reject them. If they had been given such an opportunity, rejection was near certain. 
Second, the candidates for the presidency in the election of December 1997 were under extreme pressure from the 
US to agree to the IMF’s demands unconditionally.  
5 See Crotty and Lee 2001 for a proposal for economic reform in post-crisis Korea. 
6 Only countries such as China, Taiwan and India, that maintained effective control of their capital accounts, 
remained relatively unscathed. 
7 See Crotty and Lee 2002 for a discussion of the politics of radical restructuring. 
8 See Crotty and Lee 2001 for a detailed discussion of the radical restructuring done under IMF guidance and its 
negative impact on Korea’s economy. 
9 A number of analysts consider the East Asian crisis to be but one manifestation of an emerging crisis in the global 
neoliberal economic system. See Brenner 2002 and Crotty 2000 and 2003. 
10 In an interview with one of the authors in March 1998, a leading spokesman for chaebol interests acknowledged 
that their investment response to the positive signals of 1993-95 was excessive and reflected a kind of triumphalist 
optimism in the wake of their successful efforts to free themselves of many government controls. 
11 The dramatic rise in the rate of unemployment and the attacks on labor demanded by the IMF and supported by 
President Kim after December 1997 led to a collapse in the wage share of value-added to less than 42% in 1999. 
12 Empirical studies by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994), Sarel (1997) and Nadiri and Son (1997) also support the 
thesis that TPG growth was adequate in the 1990s in Korea.  
13 Outliers are excluded from the regressions. 
14 Regressions that include cash flow or cash in stock (the short-term liquid assets of the firm) yield qualitative 
results similar to the regressions shown here. 
15 The imposition of radical neoliberal restructuring is likely to meet less popular resistance in countries that have 
suffered from a long period of economic stagnation. 
16 In the case of Korea, the US and IMF had a willing ally in President-elect Kim Dae Jung. The peculiar role played 
by Kim is described in Crotty and Lee 2002.  
